Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: Turmoil in the Disclosure Scheme for Tax Return Information by Metzler, Robert W.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 4 Summer 1981 Article 7 
1981 
Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: Turmoil in the 
Disclosure Scheme for Tax Return Information 
Robert W. Metzler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Metzler, Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: Turmoil in the Disclosure Scheme for Tax 
Return Information , 30 Cath. U. L. Rev. 675 (1981). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ZALE CORPORATION V INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE: TURMOIL IN THE
DISCLOSURE SCHEME FOR TAX
RETURN INFORMATION
Since its inception, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 has played
a predominant role in the disclosure scheme for most government records.2
Under the general rule of the FOIA, any record held by a federal agency
must be disclosed unless it falls within one or more of nine specific exemp-
tions.3 To ensure that agencies do not abuse the exemptions or otherwise
frustrate the general rule of disclosure, the FOIA provides individuals re-
questing information with a number of safeguards against unwarranted
agency retention.' These safeguards include the right to de novo review in
a federal district court of any agency decision to retain information within
the ambit of the FOIA.' Judicial interpretation of this statutory right to de
novo review has established that the government must provide detailed
justification for any decision to retain information coming within the
FOIA.
Until recently, courts have consistently ruled that the FOIA applies to
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Certain statutes expressly exempt specified data from the FOIA. Eg., 49 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (1976) (various records of the Federal Aviation Agency); I.R.C. § 6110(1) (Internal
Revenue Service written determinations).
3. The general rule of disclosure and specific modes of disclosure are set out in 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The nine exemptions are provided in 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1976). The Supreme Court has ruled that, by themselves, the FOIA exemptions
are not mandatory bars to disclosure. The exemptions simply permit the government to
retain information coming within an exemption. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293
(1979). See Note, Chrysler Corporation v. Brown. Seeking a Formulafor Responsible Disclo-
sure Under the FOI4, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1979).
4. For examples of the FOIA safeguards, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). This provision reads as follows:
(B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the
complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case, the
court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such
agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof
shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this
section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
6. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text infra.
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tax return information held by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 7 Ac-
cordingly, the FOIA's right to de novo review was available to requesters
challenging IRS determinations to withhold tax return information. In
Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service,8 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia broke from this pattern by holding that
section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code,9 which protects the confidenti-
ality of tax returns and certain information collected by the IRS on taxpay-
ers, is the sole standard governing the disclosure of tax return
information.' ° In addition, the court concluded that the applicable stan-
dard for reviewing retention of tax return information by the IRS was not
de novo review as prescribed by the FOIA, but a standard "highly deferen-
tial" to agency determinations" as set forth in chapter seven of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).12
Zale Corporation, a large Texas-based retailer, was under investigation
for possible civil and criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code.
Before charges were filed, Zale's attorneys submitted an FOIA request to
discover what information the IRS had gathered on their client.' 3 The
7. E.g., Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1979); Bruehaus v. IRS, 609 F.2d 80
(2nd Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842
(1979); Librach v. FBI, 587 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); Frue-
hauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977).
8. 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979).
9. I.R.C. § 6103. For a discussion of this provision, see notes 87-94 and accompanying
text infra.
10. 481 F. Supp. at 490.
11. Id.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1976).
13. The use of the FOIA to circumvent the discovery rules has become a common prac-
tice. The FOIA offers certain advantages over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Herndon, Discovery from the Government and the Freedom of Information Act, 31 FED'N OF
INS. COUNSEL Q. 31, 69-71 (1980) (FOIA can expedite the receipt of information, facilitate
appeal, and possibly provide attorneys fees); See Comment, Developments Under the Free-
dom of lnformationAct-1979, 1980 DUKE L.J. 139, 159-61. Cf. Note, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act-A Potential Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, 14 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 73 (1976) (discusses advantages of the FOIA in criminal discovery). Although the
Supreme Court has looked with disfavor on the use of the FOIA as a discovery device,
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) ("FOIA not intended as a
private discovery tool"), the FOIA is still a viable alternative to the Federal discovery rules
in most cases. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.7 (2d ed. Supp. 1980).
A recent congressional report recommends liberalization of the agency discovery rules as the
solution to the problem. STAFF OF THE AD. PRAC. AND PROC. SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE OVERSIGHT HEARINGS: AGENCY
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 41
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT HEARINGS]. The wisdom of this rec-
ommendation is open to question, however, since the discovery rules are already subject to
widespread abuse. See COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMITTING AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PUR-
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total number of records pursued in this request and three subsequent re-
quests on behalf of Zale exceeded 500,000. To process the requests, the
IRS had to divert personnel involved in the investigation and thereby
jeopardized potential actions against Zale. 4 Approximately 55,000 docu-
ments were eventually released. In an attempt to obtain the IRS Special
Agent's Report and other retained material, Zale petitioned the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for de novo review of the
IRS determination.15 In the proceeding, the IRS alleged that the records
were protected from mandatory disclosure by two FOIA exemptions: ex-
emption seven 16 (the exemption for certain investigatory records) and ex-
emption three' 7 (the exemption for certain nondisclosure statutes). The
government's exemption three defense claimed that paragraph 7 of section
6103(e)' S of the Internal Revenue Code authorized the IRS to retain the
SUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2072, TOGETHER WITH AN EXCERPT FROM THE REPORTS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONTAINING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NOTES, H.R. Doc. No. 306, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-18 (1980).
14. In many instances, the FOIA imposes a substantial administrative burden upon the
agency seeking to protect records from disclosure. Under the FOIA, an agency must release
"reasonably segregable" portions of a record containing some exempt information. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1976). To comply with this requirement, an agency must search through each
document line by line to ascertain if there are reasonably segregable portions. In cases such
as Zale where the number of records involved is in the hundreds of thousands, the adminis-
trative burden on the government is obviously great. Moreover, when a disappointed infor-
mation requester challenges an agency retention in court, the agency must furnish detailed
justification. See notes 37-40, 48 and accompanying text infra. Recent congressional review
of the administrative burden imposed by the FOIA indicates that expansion and improve-
ment of agency resources is the answer to this problem. OVERSIGHT HEARINGS, supra note
13, at 58-64. This type of solution has been criticized because it lacks any real cost-benefit
analysis. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:45 (2d ed. 1978).
A problem connected with the administrative burden imposed by the FOIA is the diver-
sion of agency personnel from their normal functions. This manpower diversion frequently
hampers law enforcement investigations. Shea, Is Openness Working? A Dissenting View, 38
FED. BAR J. 109, 111-12 (1980); REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES: IMPACT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCIES (GGD-78-108, Nov. 15, 1978) at 3 [hereinafter cited as COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL'S REPORT].
15. Through a pretrial stipulation, Zale modified its requests and reduced the number
of document pages sought to 11,000. 481 F. Supp. at 487 n.5. By the time the case was
decided, only 4,000 pages remained in dispute. Id at 487.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). Exemption three of the FOIA provides:
This section does not apply to matters that are--specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withhold-
ing or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
18. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7). This provision states:
Return information-Return information with respect to any taxpayer may be
19811
Catholic University Law Review
documents in question.
The IRS's exemption three defense prompted the court to examine anew
the statutory framework governing the disclosure of tax return informa-
tion. The court decided that the government had misinterpreted the rela-
tionship between section 6103 and the FOIA. 9 Through an analysis based
upon principles of statutory construction, the court reasoned that section
6103 overrides the FOIA and is the sole standard governing the release of
tax return information.20 Consequently, the court did not employ the
FOIA's de novo review but simply applied the general standard applicable
to informal agency action provided by chapter seven of the APA.21 Based
upon a record composed of detailed affidavits supplied by the IRS and a
partial in camera inspection of the documents, the court determined that
the IRS had not abused its discretion and that the documents could be
retained.22
This note will examine the statutory framework governing the disclosure
of tax return information and the judicial treatment of that framework.
Particular emphasis will be placed on the 1976 amendments to section
6103 of the Internal Revenue Code2 3 and exemption three of the FOIA,2 4
because judicial interpretation of these amendments has resulted in con-
flicting views regarding the relationship between section 6103 and the
FOIA. A critical evaluation of these statutes and the reasoning behind the
open to inspection by or disclosure to any person authorized by this subsection
[I.R.C. § 6103(e)] to inspect any return of such taxpayer if the Secretary determines
that such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal Tax Administration.
The above provision of the Internal Revenue Code was redesignated from 6 of § 6103(e)
to $ 7 by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 3(c)(1), reprinted in 1981-3
I.R.B. 16, at 22. Because the case law interpreting 7 has generally referred to this as
§ 6103(e)(6), this note will hereinafter refer to 7 of § 6103(e) as § 6103(e)(6).
19. 481 F. Supp. at 487-88.
20. Id at 488-91.
21. The rationale governing judicial review under Chapter Seven of the APA has con-
founded legal scholars. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780 (1975) (rules governing judicial review have little substance); Ra-
bin, Administrative Law in Transition. A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Princple, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 120, 128, 130 (1977) ("judicial intervention is ad hoc and almost always
unsystematic"); Note, The Supreme Court's Use of Statutory Interpretation: Morris v. Ges-
sette, APA Nonreviewability, and the Idea of a Legislative Scheme, 87 YALE L.J. 1636 (1978)
(analytical flaws in Supreme Court administrative law decision, Morris v. Gressete, 432 U.S.
491 (1977)). Under the APA, however, an aggrieved party can generally challenge agency
action as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 29.01-
2 (1st ed. Supp. 1980).
22. 481 F. Supp. at 490-91.
23. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1525 (1976).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
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Zale decision will demonstrate that the FOIA's de novo review rather than
the deferential APA standard should be employed by the courts scrutiniz-
ing IRS determinations to withhold tax return information from the pub-
lic.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISCLOSURE SCHEME FOR TAX RETURN
INFORMATION PRIOR TO THE 1976 AMENDMENTS OF SECTION
6103 AND THE FOIA
A. The FOIA: Implementation of A Full Disclosure Philosophy
The FOIA was enacted in 1966 to improve public access to information
held by government agencies. Prior to its enactment, access to agency
records was governed by section 3 of the APA.25 Under the APA disclo-
sure scheme, a government agency that did not want to make public a
requested record needed only to allege that the record was being withheld
for "good cause" or in the "public interest."26 In addition, individuals
seeking information under the APA had the burden of showing that they
were "persons properly and directly concerned."27 Consequently, section
3 of the APA, although labeled a public disclosure section, was in reality a
license for agency withholding.28
In replacing the ineffective access provisions of the APA, the FOIA em-
braced a philosophy of full agency disclosure.29 Interests such as the pri-
vacy of medical and personnel information held by the government were
protected only if such information fell within one or more of nine specific
exemptions. 30 To protect against unwarranted agency retention of records,
the Act provided frustrated requesters with a right to de novo review in a
federal district court.3' This right was enhanced by placing upon the gov-
ernment the burden of justifying record retention in any such court ac-
tion.32 Through this disclosure scheme, the framers of the FOIA hoped to
25. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (formerly codified as 5 U.S.C. § 1002).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2418, 2422-23 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1497].
27. Id at 2423.
28. For a discussion of the inadequacies of § 3 of the APA, see Discussion ofthe Legisla-
tive History of the Freedom of Information Act, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 6-10 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
cited as FOIA SOURCE BOOK].
29. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK
supra note 28, at 38. "It is the purpose of the present bill to ... establish a general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statu-
tory language." Id
30. Id at 38, 43-44.
31. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
32. Id
19811
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provide a "workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects
all the interests yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure. 33
B. The Vaughn Decision and the 1974 Amendments of the FOIA:
Putting Teeth into the FOL4
Seven years after enactment of the FOIA, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided the landmark case of
Vaughn v. Rosen . In Vaughn, the court formulated a procedure which
would allow the government to meet its burden of justifying retention
under the Act without requiring the court to perform an in camera inspec-
tion of the requested information. Vaughn, a law professor doing research
on the Civil Service Commission, exercised his right to de novo review
pursuant to the FOIA after the Commission had denied his request for
certain information. The Commission submitted to the court an affidavit
which did not reveal the contents of the information sought but simply set
forth in conclusory terms the opinion of the Director of the Bureau of
Personnel Management that the data requested came within three FOIA
exemptions. Relying solely upon the affidavit, the trial court ruled for the
Commission.35 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the
case because the record in the decision below was insufficient to permit a
determination of whether the documents were subject to disclosure under
the FOIA.36 In its directions, the court of appeals required the govern-
ment to furnish what would later become known as a Vaughn index.
37
The government was directed to itemize and index the documents, or por-
tions thereof, in order to show which were subject to disclosure and which
were allegedly exempt.38 The decision in Vaughn explicitly rejected
agency justification of nondisclosure through conclusory and generalized
33. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 28, at 38.
34. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
35. Id at 823.
36. Id at 828.
37. A Vaughn index is a type of detailed affidavit often employed by trial courts in
FOIA cases as a substitute for in camera inspection. Three indispensible elements of this
index have been identified: the index should be contained in one document; the index must
describe each item withheld; and the index must state the exemption claimed for each reten-
tion and explain why the exemption applies. Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603
F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Courts have recognized the large administrative burden
imposed by the Vaughn index but have consistently deferred to the FOIA's policy in favor of
full disclosure when the government has raised the burden as a ground to avoid detailed
justification. Eg., Long v. United States, 596 F.2d 362, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 917 (1980); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d
242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
38. 484 F.2d at 828.
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allegations of exemptions 39 and provided a standard against which the
government's burden of justification would be measured.4"
In 1974, Congress amended the FOIA in an attempt to overcome persist-
ing government roadblocks to the free flow of information.4' The amend-
ments narrowed the scope of the Act's first42 and seventh 43 exemptions. In
addition, Congress substantially expanded the safeguards in the FOIA for
information requesters. The new protections included specific time limits
for agency responses to information requests,44 attorneys fees for plaintiffs
who substantially prevail, 45 administrative sanctions against malfeasant
government employees, 46 and the availability of "reasonably segregable
portions" of records containing some exempt material. 47 The 1974 amend-
ments also granted reviewing courts the discretion to rely upon detailed
affidavits, thereby sanctioning the Vaughn decision.48
39. Id at 826.
40. Decisions subsequent to Vaughn have established that the detailed justification re-
quirement can be satisfied by variations of the basic procedure set forth in Vaughn. E.g.,
Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1980) (generic classification of documents can
be substituted for a specific faciual showing for each document in certain exemption seven
cases); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 1976) (affidavit
without itemization reciting attorney's review of documents); Ash Grove Cement Co. v.
FTC, 511 F.2d 815, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (random in camera sampling of documents plus
generalized description of the documents in an affidavit). Just how far a court can deviate
from the Vaughn index is not clear. The dangers of deviating too far are demonstrated in a
recent decision. Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980) (unitemized affidavit
claiming that IRS special agent had reviewed the documents and determined that they came
within exemption three was erroneous and caused trial judge to uphold an improper reten-
tion).
41. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6267, 6268-71.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Exemption one protects national defense and foreign
policy information classified under executive order.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). Exemption seven protects certain investigatory, law
enforcement records.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) & (6) (1976).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
48. After the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, the Act provides that a reviewing court
"may examine the contents of ... agency records in camera." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)
(1976) (emphasis added). The conference report accompanying the 1974 amendments indi-
cates that before an in camera inspection is ordered, the government should be given an
opportunity through detailed affidavits or testimony to demonstrate that records are exempt
from disclosure. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6287-88.
1981]
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C. The Disclosure Restrictions of Section 6103 and the FOIA 's
Exemption for Nondisclosure Statutes
More than half a century before enactment of the FOIA, Congress cre-
ated a statutory framework restricting the disclosure of tax returns. In the
Tariff Act of 1913,49 tax returns were described as "public records." Public
access to tax returns was not, however, automatic. These so-called public
records were "open to public inspection upon order of the President, under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and
approved by the President."5 In 1954, this basic pattern with a few minor
alterations5' was codified into section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code.52
No appellate court ruled on the relationship between the access-restrict-
ing section 6103 and the FOIA until 1974. In that year, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service53 determined that original section
6103 could be reconciled with the FOIA through the FOIA's third exemp-
tion. At issue in Tax Analysts was an IRS determination to retain two
types of records: letter rulings and technical advice memoranda. The
court decided that the letter rulings were not a kind of material coming
within original section 6103.54 Therefore, this statute could not be used to
justify nondisclosure of letter rulings. When the court considered the re-
tention of technical advice memoranda, it reached a different result. Be-
cause these memoranda dealt with information contained in tax returns,
the court ruled that the access-restricting section 6103 applied to them.55
However, the question of reconciling this nondisclosure statute with the
49. Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
50. Id.
51. The exceptions to the basic pattern were as follows: one, state and local officials
could obtain any return for purposes of administering their tax laws, Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch.
736, § 6103(b), 68A Stat. 3 (1954); two, shareholders had access to returns of corporations of
which they held one percent of the shares, Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, § 6103(c), 68A Stat. 3
(1954); three, any member of the public was entitled to know whether a particular person
had filed a return. Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, § 6103(0, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
In 1974, a fourth exception was added: returns were made available to the Labor Depart-
ment and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation for purposes of administering the Pen-
sion Reform Act. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1022(h), 88 Stat. 829 (1974).. Section 6103, as it
existed after its 1954 codification but prior to the 1976 amendment, will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as original § 6103.
52. For a more complete discussion of the history of § 6103, see Benedict & Lupert,
Federal Income Tax Returns-The. Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 947-48 (1979).
53. 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
54. d. at 354-55.
55. Id at 355.
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FOIA's general disclosure rule remained. The court relied on exemption
three of the FOIA to answer this question. As originally enacted, this ex-
emption protected material "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute."56 The court held that the material coming within original section
6103 was such material and was therefore exempt from the FOIA's general
disclosure rule.
57
In other contexts, however, courts did not always find that the FOIA
and statutes authorizing nondisclosure could be reconciled through ex-
emption three as originally enacted. For example, in Stretch v. Wein-
berger,58 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare withheld
reports concerning the performance of nursing homes receiving federal
funds under Medicare. Section 1106(a) of the Social Security Act prohib-
ited disclosure of "any. . . report obtained at any time by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare. . . in the course of discharging. . . [his]
duties . . . except as the Secretary . . . may prescribe by regulations."59
The Third Circuit ruled that an exempting statute under the original ex-
emption three must "prescribe some basis" to guide an administrator with
discretion on disclosure and that section 1106(a) did not prescribe 'such a
basis. 6' Therefore, the nursing home performance reports were not ex-
empt from the FOIA's general rule requiring disclosure. 61 The Stretch de-
cision implicitly repealed section 1106(a) to the extent that it was in
conflict with the FOIA.
In 1975, the Supreme Court rejected the restrictive view of exemption
three typified by Stretch. In Federal Aviation Administration v. Robert-
56. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (1967). Exemption three of the FOIA, prior to its
1976 amendment, will hereinafter be referred to as original exemption three.
57. 505 F.2d at 355. Decisions subsequent to Tax Analysts & Advocates agreed that
material coming within original section 6103 was exempted from the FOIA's general disclo-
sure rule by original exemption three. Mason v. Callaway, 554 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415 (D.D.C.
1976); Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co. v. IRS, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-6111 (D. Minn. 1975).
Two other courts also considered IRS nondisclosures of tax records under original § 6103.
Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975) vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1085
(1977); B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974). These two courts, how-
ever, did not reach the issue whether original § 6103, as a nondisclosure statute, could be
reconciled with the disclosure provision of the FOIA. In these two decisions, the tax records
at issue were found to be outside the nondisclosure authorization of original § 6103. Since
the material at issue did not come within the nondisclosure statute, there was no need to
consider whether the nondisclosure statute and the FOIA were reconcilable.
58. 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974).
59. Pub. L. No. 81-734, ch. 809, § 403(d), 64 Stat. 477 (1950), as amended by 1953
Reorg. Plan No. I §§ 5, 8, 67 Stat. 631 (1953) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
60. 495 F.2d at 640-41.
61. Id
1981]
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son,62 the Court was asked to determine whether section 1104 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 195863 met the criterion of original exemption three.
Section 1104 allowed the Federal Aviation Administrator to withhold re-
quested records if he determined that disclosure would adversely affect the
interests of a party objecting to disclosure and if he determined that disclo-
sure was not in the public interest.' 4 Unlike the Third Circuit in Stretch,
the Supreme Court was not troubled by the agency's broad discretion to
disclose or withhold under the statute at issue. From a review of the legis-
lative history of the FOIA, the Court found that Congress did not express
an intention to repeal nondisclosure statutes that were in effect at the time
the FOIA was enacted.65 Moreover, the Court ruled that there was no
"inevitable inconsistency" between the congressional intent to replace the
broad standard of section 3 of the APA with the FOIA and the intent of
section 110466 to give the Administrator broad discretion. The Court con-
cluded that the FOIA did not repeal section 1104 by implication and that
this section came within original exemption three.67 The Supreme Court's
inclusion of this liberal nondisclosure statute within original exemption
three indicated that virtually any nondisclosure statute came within the
scope of this exemption.
II. THE 1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE FOIA AND SECTION 6103
A. Narrowing the Scope of Exemption Three
In 1976, Congress amended exemption three of the FOIA specifically to
overrule the broad interpretation set forth in Robertson .68 The new ver-
sion of this exemption 69 distinguishes between two types of nondisclosure
statutes. The first type does not allow an agency any discretion regarding
disclosure and automatically qualifies under exemption three. The second
type of statute permits an agency to exercise discretion on disclosure. To
qualify under exemption three, however, a discretionary nondisclosure
statute must refer to "particular criteria" to be used by an agency in exer-
cising its discretion. Since certain nondisclosure statutes enacted prior to
62. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
63. Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1104, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (formerly codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1504).
64. Id
65. 422 U.S. at 263-65.
66. Id at 266-67.
67. Id at 267.
68. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 2244, 2260-61 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1441].
69. See note 17 supra for the text of exemption three.
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1976 do not meet these requirements, 7° the revised scheme of exemption
three represents a limited endorsement of repeal by implication.7'
The legislative history accompanying the amendment to exemption
three does not provide extensive guidance regarding the degree to which
the amendment narrowed the exemption. The conference report 72 gives
two examples of nondisclosure statutes which do not come within the re-
vised exemption: section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act 73 and section
1106 of the Social Security Act.74 Each of these statutes grants its respec-
tive agency considerable discretion to disclose or retain information.75
Consequently, disqualification of these two statutes under exemption three
is not particularly instructive in determining the degree of specificity re-
quired by the revised exemption.
Other portions of the legislative history list several nondisclosure stat-
utes qualifying or nonqualifying under amended exemption three.76 Yet
these references also provide insufficient guidance. The various changes
70. See notes 72-74, 76 and accompanying text infra.
71. For a thorough discussion of the revision of exemption three, see Note, The Effect of
the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1029 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exemption Three].
72. HOUSE REPORT 1441, supra note 68, at 2260-61.
73. Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act was ruled within the scope of original
exemption three by the Supreme Court. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra.
74. The Third Circuit disqualified § 1106 of the Social Security Act under original ex-
emption three. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 59 & 64 and accompanying text supra.
76. Besides the two nonqualifying statutes listed in the conference report, several other
nondisclosure statutes are mentioned in the legislative history of the 1976 amendment to
exemption three. Most of these statutes appear in the Government Operations Committee
report. H.R. REP. No. 880 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2204-05 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 880 (PART I)].
In this report, the following statutes were described as coming within exemption three: the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166 (1976) (functions transferred by 42
U.S.C. §§ 5814, 5841, 7151(a), & 7293 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 314(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 437g(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979)); the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 801,
72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended by Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-259, § 2, 86 Stat.
95 (1972) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) & 2000e-8(e) (1976).
In addition, the report indicates that the Trade Secrets Act of 1958, 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976), does not come within exemption three as then proposed. On the House floor, Rep.
Abzug, chairperson of the subcommittee which initiated the amendment of exemption three,
indicated that three statutes qualified. On July 28, 1976, she cited the Immigration Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1202(f) (1976) and a provision of the Census Title, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). 122 CONG.
REC. 24181 (1976). On August 31, 1976, Rep. Abzug proclaimed that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976), also came within exemption three as
amended. 122 CONG. REC. 28473 (1976).
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that occurred in the formulation of the wording for exemption three77 and
the conference report's failure to mention any of these statutes 78 obscure
the final congressional intent regarding all but one of these potential
guides. The one remaining statute, section 6 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949,7 9 was cited in the House debate just before the final
vote by the House on the amendment of exemption three as qualifying
and, thus, provides an accurate indicator of the House's intent."0 There is
no evidence, however, that the Senate shared this intent. Hence, section 6
of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 is also only of limited use in ascer-
taining what Congress had in mind when it amended exemption three of
the FOIA.
B. The Bifurcation of Section 6103
While Congress was at work narrowing the scope of exemption three, it
was also revamping the disclosure scheme of section 6103 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.81 Under the revised scheme, disclosure of tax
77. Exemption three of the FOIA was amended through a rider to the Government in
the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). The amendment was first pro-
posed by the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights of
the Committee on Government Operations headed by Rep. Abzug. See Legislative History
of the Government in the Sunshine Act- S.5 (Pub. L. No. 94-409), COMM. ON GOV'T OPER.,
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT SOURCE BOOK 3-4 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
cited as SUNSHINE SOURCE BOOK]. As initially proposed, the amendment would have ex-
empted only material "required to be withheld from the public by any statute establishing
particular criteria or referring to particular types of information." H.R. 11656, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 552(b)(3) (1976), reprinted in SUNSHINE SOURCE BOOK, supra at 477. Subse-
quently, the proposed amendment went to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which
expressed concern that the proposed amendment would exclude all discretionary nondisclo-
sure statutes. H.R. REP. No. 880 (PART II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2212, 2216-17. Consequently, the words "or permitted" were
inserted into the proposed language after "required." Id at 2218. When the revised lan-
guage was debated on the House floor, Rep. McKloskey proposed, and the House adopted,
language that would eliminate the particular criteria test and the particular types of informa-
tion test from statutes giving an agency no choice on retention. 122 CONG. REC. 24211-13
(1976). In conference, the language was polished, HOUSE REPORT 1441, supra note 68, at
2260-61, and the conference version was finally enacted into law.
Since the Government Operations Committee Report, HOUSE REPORT 880 (PART I),
supra note 76, was issued prior to any of the changes in the language of proposed revision of
exemption three, and since the July 29, 1976 remarks of Rep. Abzug, see note 76 supra, were
made prior to the McKloskey amendment, the final congressional intent regarding the stat-
utes cited by these sources is unclear.
78. The omission of these statutes from the conference report, which lists two examples
of nonqualifying statutes, HOUSE REPORT 1441, supra note 68, at 2260-61, suggests a con-
gressional abandonment of these preconference report guides.
79. 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976).
80. 122 CONG. REC. 28473 (1976).
81. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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returns and return information" is governed by an amended version of
section 6103. Disclosure of IRS written determinations is controlled by a
new provision, section 6110.83
The newly created section 6110 was designed to open up the body of law
contained in IRS private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and
determination letters.84 Under this section's general rule, written determi-
nations and their background files are open to public inspection after the
IRS deletes details identifying a particular party and information similar
to that protected by several of the FOIA exemptions.85 Moreover, because
of an exclusive remedy provision in this section, disclosure of written de-
terminations is not subject to the FOIA.8 6
82. Returns and return information are defined in I.R.C. § 6103(b), as follows:
(1) Return-The term "return" means any tax or information return, declara-
tion of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted
under, the provisions of this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of,
or with respect to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, includ-
ing supporting schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part
of, the return so filed.
(2) Return information-The term "return information" means: (A) a tax-
payer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax with-
held, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments whether the taxpayer's return
was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or
any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by
the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the
existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person
under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or
offense, and
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document
relating to such written determination (as such terms are defined in section
6110(b)) which is not open to public inspection under section 6110, but such term
does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise
identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
83. I.R.C. § 6110.
84. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3208-09 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT 658]; S. REP. No.
938 (PART I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 305-06, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3439, 3734-35 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT 938 (PART I)].
85. I.R.C. § 6110(a). The items that must be deleted to "sanitize" written determina-
tions before they are open to the public are stated in I.R.C. § 6110(c).
86. I.R.C. § 6110(1). The exclusive remedy provision provides:
(1) Exclusive remedy-Except as otherwise provided in this title, or with respect
to a discovery order made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the Secretary
shall not be required by any court to make any written determination or back-
ground file document open or available to public inspection, or to refrain from
disclosure of any documents.
Courts have confirmed that § 6110(1) preempts the FOIA. Eg., Grenier v. IRS, 449 F.
Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1978); Conway v. IRS, 447 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1978).
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Unlike the creation of section 6110, the revision of section 6103 was not
designed to promote increased access to information. The goal of the
amended section 6103 was to balance the needs of a variety of government
bodies for tax return information against "the citizen's right of privacy and
the related impact of disclosure upon our country's voluntary tax assess-
ment system.",8 7 Additional concerns prompting the revision of section
6103 included the IRS practice of indiscriminately releasing tax returns to
other government agencies for reasons unrelated to tax administration and
White House abuse of tax returns.88
The structure of the revised section 6103 presents a marked contrast to
that of its predecessor. Prior to the amendment, disclosure of tax returns
was controlled to a large extent by the discretion of the President and vari-
ous executive officers.89 In its amended form, subsection 6103(a)90 states
the general rule that tax return information is confidential and can be dis-
closed only if its release is specifically authorized in the Internal Revenue
Code. Specific authorizations are provided in other subsections, most of
which designate the various government bodies that may receive tax re-
turns and return information with attendant conditions for receipt.91 Two
other provisions regulate disclosure to limited segments of the public. Au-
thorizations for parties designated by the taxpayer are contained in subsec-
tion 6103(c).92 Subsection 6103(e) 93 governs release to persons having a
material interest in the information. Release of return information under
these two subsections is restricted to situations where the Secretary of the
Treasury has determined that disclosure will not seriously impair federal
tax administration.94 In sum, unlike its predecessor, revised section 6103
provides a detailed scheme controlling the dissemination of tax returns
and return information.
87. SENATE REPORT 938 (PART I), supra note 84, at 3747. When the House initially
proposed its version of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, it did not include a proposal to amend
§ 6103. Under the original House version, the issue of tax return confidentiality was left to
further legislation. HousE REPORT 658 supra note 84, at 2911. Thus, the amended version
of § 6103 is largely the work of the Senate.
88. SENATE REPORT 938 (PART I), supra note 84, at 3746-47.
89. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
90. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
91. I.R.C. § 6103(d), (0-(o).
92. I.R.C. § 6103(c).
93. I.R.C. § 6103(e).
94. The pertinent portion of § 6103(c) provides "return information shall not be dis-
closed . . . if the Secretary determines that such disclosure would seriously impair Federal
tax administration." In § 6103(e), the restriction on the release of return information is
stated differently. For the text of the relevant portion of this section, see note 18 upra.
The two subsections do not place a similar restriction on the release of "returns." For the
definition of "returns" and "return information," see note 82 supra. "
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One area not clarified by either the 1976 amendment to section 6103 or
the revision of the FOIA's third exemption was the precise relationship
between section 6103, the FOIA, and exemption three. Although the
amendments represented significant changes to their respective disclosure
schemes and were enacted within one month of each other, neither the
language nor the legislative reports of the two amendments specifically re-
fer to each other.95 Only a brief reference in the conference report for
section 6110, a remark by Senator Haskell in the Senate debates, and ex-
emption three, itself, provide some indication that the FOIA governs re-
turn information, the subject matter of section 6103.96 Due to
congressional default, the task of deciphering the relationship between the
two statutes was apparently left to the courts.97
III. PLACING AMENDED SECTION 6103 WITHIN AMENDED EXEMPTION
THREE: FRUEHAUF AND CHAMBERLAIN
Before the Zale decision, courts98 examining the relationship between
the FOIA and section 6103 after their 1976 amendments viewed this pro-
cess as one of determining whether particular provisions of section 6103
met the requirements of exemption three. The critical questions were
whether subsection 6103(a) came within the provision of exemption three
excepting mandatory nondisclosure statutes and whether subsections
6103(c) and 6103(e)(6)99 met the test of exemption three for statutes al-
lowing discretion on disclosure.
A. Subsection 6103(a) and the Fruehauf Decision
In Fruehauf Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service, l° the Sixth Circuit
became the first United States Court of Appeals to rule that subsection
6103(a) is a statute granting an agency no discretion on disclosure within
the meaning of exemption three. At issue in Fruehauf was the IRS's non-
disclosure of various private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda,
related background files, indexing systems, and communications with
outside parties regarding the federal excise tax on automobile and truck
95. The amendment to exemption three was passed on Aug. 31, 1976. [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183. The revision of § 6103 was enacted on Sept. 16, 1976. Id at
2897.
96. See notes 157-67 and accompanying text infra.
97. See American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (1978) (Congress left
task of sorting out which nondisclosures statutes come within exemption three to the courts).
98. For a partial list of these courts, see note 7 supra.
99. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7) (formerly I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6)). See note 18 supra.
100. 566 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1977).
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sales. Previously, in 1975, the Sixth Circuit had ruled on this very ques-
tion. 01 At that time, however, the controlling statutes were the original
versions of section 6103 and exemption three. In the earlier decision, the
court ruled that none of the requested information fell within original sec-
tion 6103 and that all the records, therefore, had to be disclosed under the
FOIA's general rule unless an exemption other than exemption three ap-
plied.'" 2 Subsequently, the IRS petitioned for and was granted certio-
rari. 10 3 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of the 1976 changes in the Internal Reve-
nue Code's disclosure scheme." Prior to the rehearing, the IRS released
all the items except the background files and indexing systems. On re-
mand, the IRS alleged that the remaining information was return informa-
tion under section 6103 and therefore exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA. The court ruled that the information at issue was not return infor-
mation, 0 15 thus eliminating the need to reach the second half of the IRS's
argument. To provide guidance for future courts, however, the Fruehauf
court determined that "in general the language of section 6103 contains a
mandatory requirement that returns and return information be withheld
from the public."'" Consequently, the court concluded that subsection
6103(a) met the test of exemption three for statutes giving an agency no
discretion of disclosure.'0 7 The court suggested, however, that it was not
ruling on whether-the discretionary provisions, subsections 6103(c) and
6103(e)(6), met the requirements of exemption three.'0o Therefore, a ques-
tion remained whether these two subsections came within exemption three.
B. The Discretionary Nondisclosure Provisions of Section 6103 and the
Chamberlain Decision
In Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 1°9 the Fifth Circuit addressed the question left
open in Fruehauf. Chamberlain, a taxpayer under investigation for un-
derpayment of his taxes and possible fraud, filed an FOIA request with the
101. Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429
U.S. 1085 (1977)).
102. 522 F.2d at 287-90.
103. 423 U.S. 1047 (1975).
104. IRS v. Fruehauf Corp., 429 U.S. 1085 (1977). Upon remand, the Sixth Circuit also
considered the 1976 amendment to exemption three. 566 F.2d at 578.
105. Id at 579-80.
106. Id at 578 n.6.
107. Id
108. Id For cases following Fruehauf, see Long v. United States, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); Bruehaus v. IRS, 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979).
109. 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
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IRS in 1973 seeking approximately 400 pages of documents compiled dur-
ing the investigation of Chamberlain and the IRS manual outlining inter-
nal operating procedures. At the administrative level, the taxpayer and the
Service narrowed the number of disputed documents to ninety-one, but
neither party made any concessions on the manual. The district court,
through an application of the original version of exemption three and sev-
eral other FOIA exemptions, ruled that various documents could be with-
held in their entirety and that portions of the remaining files could be
retained.' Both parties to the litigation appealed on a variety of grounds.
Among the IRS claims was a contention not raised in the prior litigation.
Between the district court's order and the appeal, the 1976 amendments to
exemption three and section 6103 became law. In light of the amend-
ments, the Service alleged that fifty-eight of the documents involved in the
complicated cross-appeal were return information protected by section
6103, which the IRS claimed was a qualifying statute under exemption
three. The Fifth Circuit narrowed the issue to whether subsections 6103(c)
and 6103(e)(6)1 " were "sufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of
Exemption 3 of the FOIA."' I2 In deciding this question in the affirmative,
the Chamberlain court articulated the view that the discretionary provi-
sions of section 6103 come within exemption three."13
The court's analysis began with an examination of the language of ex-
emption three and the two subsections of section 6103. The court first pos-
ited the rule of exemption three for statutes affording agencies discretion
on disclosure: that a statute must either establish particular criteria or re-
fer to particular types of matters. In the court's opinion, the criterion guid-
ing the discretion granted by the two subsections, namely a serious
impairment of federal tax administration, was sufficiently particular to sat-
isfy exemption three."' In addition, the court held that the discretionary
provisions of section 6103 met the alternative (particular types of matter)
test of exemption three," 5 reasoning that the "subsections apply only to a
particular type of matter, return information, which is carefully defined by
statute."' 16
110. Chamberlain v. Alexander, 419 F. Supp. 235, 241-45 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
111. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7) (formerly I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6)). See note 18 supra.
112. 589 F.2d at 838. "
113. Numerous courts have cited Chamberlain as precedent for holding that § 6103(c) or
§ 6103(e)(6) meets the requirements of exemption three. E.g., Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268,
1274 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980); Solomon v. IRS, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-353, 80-355 (DD.C. 1979).
114. 589 F.2d at 839.
115. Id
116. The Court's statement is technically incorrect. Although the rule of § 6103(e)(6) is
limited to "return information," § 6103(c) governs both "returns" and "return information."
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The court supported its interpretation of the statutes at issue through a
review of the legislative history of exemption three. Citing the Govern-
ment Operations Committee report and the conference report, the court
decided that when Congress amended exemption three, it was trying to
reach the problem of unfettered agency discretion to disclose or retain in-
formation." 7 Having established the basic goal of the amendment, the
court concluded, with minimal explanation," 8 that Congress did not in-
tend to eliminate all agency discretion on disclosure." 9 Rather, the court
determined that Congress sought to restrict this discretion only if it was not
limited by certain defined matters or informed by established criteria.
20
Intertwined in the Chamberlain court's discussion of exemption three's
legislative history was a comparison of subsections 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6)
to other statutes that the court considered qualifying or nonqualifying
under exemption three. Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act, a non-
qualifying statute, ' 2 ' was distinguished from the two subsections of section
6103 on the ground that the discretion permitted in the subsections was
limited to certain defined matters and informed by established criteria.
122
The court also compared the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to the subsec-
tions. 123 This Act had been cited in the Government Operations Commit-
See notes 82, 92-94 and accompanying text supra. Hence, the subsections do not apply only
to "return information." This oversight, however, does not appear to affect the court's hold-
ing that the subsections apply to a matter carefully defined by statute.
An argument against the Chamberlain view of the language of exemption three and
§ 6103(c) & (e)(6) would state that "returns" and "return information" are not "particular
types of matters" and that serious impairment of federal tax administration is not "particu-
lar criteria" within the meaning of exemption three. Given the well established principle
that FOIA exemptions are to be construed narrowly, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820,
823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); see 2 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J.
GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.01 (1st ed. & Supp. 1980), a court could define "particu-
lar" narrowly and hold that the matter and criteria of the two subsections were not "particu-
lar" within the meaning of exemption three. The language of exemption three and § 6103(c)
& (e)(6), by itself, does not preclude such an interpretation.
117. For a discussion of the legislative history of exemption three, see notes 72-80 and
accompanying text supra.
118. 589 F.2d at 839 n.37. The court supported its holding by a general citation to a law
review note analyzing exemption three. See Note, Exemption Three, supra note 71.
119. 589 F.2d at 839.
120. Id The court viewed the legislative history of the amendment to exemption three
generously. The court apparently believed that Congress did not intend to restrict the scope
of exemption three greatly. The reliable indicators in the legislative history of exemption
three, however, are few. See notes 72-80 and accompanying text supra. The Chamberlain
view of the legislative history is not necessitated by the few indicators that there are. Id
121. See notes 68 & 73 and accompanying text supra.
122. 589 F.2d at 839.
123. Id at 839 n.38. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1958 is a reliable indicator of
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tee report for the amendment to exemption three as a qualifying statute. 24
The court noted that the matter referred to in this Act was "Restricted
Data" and that the criteria guiding agency discretion on disclosure in the
Act was "undue risk to the common defense and security."'1 25 In the
court's opinion, the matter and criteria of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
was no more narrow or specific than the matter and criteria of subsections
6103(c) and 6103(e)(6).' 26 To buttress this holding, the court found with-
out explanation that certain nondisclosure statutes, adjudged qualifying
under exemption three by other circuits, were also analogous to subsec-
tions 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6). 127
The final step in the Chamberlain analysis relied upon the well-estab-
lished principle of statutory construction that statutes should be reconciled
wherever possible.' 28 In applying this principle, the court first recognized
that the amendments to exemption three and section 6103 were enacted
within one month of each other.129 The court then noted that the drafters
of section 6103 must have been aware of the FOIA since the Act was fre-
quently mentioned in the portion of the Senate Finance Committee report
for the Tax Reform Act of 1976 explaining section 6110, the companion
provision of section 6103.3 ° Therefore, the court concluded, Congress
could not have "enacted a comprehensive scheme for releasing informa-
tion to taxpayers with the intention that it have no further applicability
once the taxpayer files an FOIA suit."''
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Fruehauf and the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Chamberlain placed the provisions of section 6103 governing public dis-
closure within the FOIA's exemption for nondisclosure statutes. Both of
these courts apparently assumed that this placement was sufficent to recon-
cile section 6103 and the FOIA after their 1976 amendments. Neither
congressional intent is open to question. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra; see
also Note, Exemption Three, supra note 71, at 1042.
124. See note 76 supra.
125. 589 F.2d at 838 n.38.
126. Id
127. Id Cases cited and statutes held qualifying therein are as follows: Lee
Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979)
(35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976)); National Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Social Justice v. CIA,
576 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978) (50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g (1976)); Baker v. CIA, 580
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976)).
128. 589 F.2d at 840. For a general discussion of this principle, see 2A C. SANDS, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.02 & 53.01 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [here-
inafter cited as SANDS].
129. 589 F.2d at 840. For the enactment dates, see note 95 supra.
130. 589 F.2d at 840.
131. Id
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court considered whether section 6103 and the FOIA were irreconcilable
regardless of section 6103's status under exemption three. In short, these
courts did not consider the possibility that section 6103 had implicitly re-
pealed the FOIA in the area of tax return information.
IV. Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: REMOVING TAX
RETURN INFORMATION FROM THE AMBIT OF THE FOIA
A. The Zale Decision.- An Application of Statutory Canons
In Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service, Judge Gesell of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that
section 6103 was the sole standard governing the disclosure of tax returns
and return information. 132 In so ruling, the court did not dispute that sec-
tion 6103 was a nondisclosure statute within the scope of exemption
three. 133 Rather, the court arrived at its decision through an application of
principles of statutory construction in which section 6103's status under
exemption three was of no consequence.
The Zale court purported to rely upon four principles of statutory con-
struction to ascertain the statutory framework controlling the disclosure of
tax return information. First, the court recited the well-established princi-
ple that statutes should be construed harmoniously where it is reasonable
to do So. 13 4 The court's second and third canons were set forth in a single
statement: "absent a clear indication to the contrary, . . . specific legisla-
tion will not be controlled by the more general,. . . nor will the later pro-
vision be nullified in light of the earlier."' 135 The final principle cited by
132. 481 F. Supp. at 490.
133. Id at 490 n.13. The court specifically noted that § 6103 met the requirements of
exemption three.
134. Id at 488. The Chamberlain court also employed this principle in arriving at its
decision. See notes 128-31 and accompanying text supra.
135. 481 F. Supp. at 488. The court's statement paraphrased two long-standing canons
of statutory construction. The first principle states that if two statutes are in conflict, a spe-
cific statute controls a general one, absent an indication from the legislature that the general
one should control. See SANDS, supra note 128, at § 51.05. The Zale court's paraphrasing
of this principle, while technically correct, does not explain an important corollary of this
principle, namely that specific and general statutes must be construed together absent con-
flict. Id Consequently, the statement that a general statute does not control a specific one
does not imply that the general one is negated, at least in the absence of conflict. Eg., Utah
v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 446 U.S. 500 (1980)
("absolute incompatibility" required before a specific statute nullifies a general act).
The second principle proclaims that if two statutes are in conflict, a later provision con-
trols the earlier absent an appropriate signal from the legislature to the contrary. See
SANDS, supra note 128, at § 51.03. As was the case in the principle for specific and general
statutes, there must be conflict before any negation occurs under this principle. Eg., North-
ern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704, 719-20 (10th Cir. 1971).
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the Zale court pointed out that the duty to reconcile statutes becomes "vir-
tually irresistible" when the same Congress enacts the statutes at issue. 1
36
The court did not apply these principles in a systematic fashion. Instead,
the court randomly compared various aspects of section 6103 and the
FOIA. Through these comparisons, the court attempted to establish that
its second and third canons dictate section 6103 negation of the FOIA.
Initially, the court determined that section 6103 is a specific and later stat-
ute while the FOIA is a general and earlier act. 13 7 Next, an explanation of
the purposes of the statutes at issue was undertaken. The court pointed out
that Congress did not intend to foster disclosure when it amended section
6103.138 Rather, Congress sought to abolish the executive order scheme
governing the disclosure of tax returns prior to the amendment and to
"carve out a special protection for. . . a unique and highly sensitive type
of information."'' 39 The court decided that this purpose stood in sharp
contrast to the FOIA's preference for disclosure to the public at large. 140
The court also found that the structures of the FOIA and section 6103 were
markedly different.14 1 Section 6103 specifies in detail the groups to which
disclosure is warranted and the types of information that can be dis-
closed.'4 2 The court compared these detailed disclosure rules to the
FOIA's general mandate calling for the release of information to the pub-
lic without any showing of need. 4 3 From its examination of the structures
and purposes of the two statutes, the court concluded that there is "no
evidence of an intention to allow. . . the FOIA to negate, supersede, or
otherwise frustrate the clear purpose and structure of 6103."'" Relying on
its second and third principles, the court then ruled that the generalized
strictures of the FOIA could not prospectively preempt the subsequently
enacted particularized disclosure scheme of section 6103. 145 From this
holding, the court drew the additional conclusion that section 6103 was the
sole standard governing the release of tax return information. ' 46
136. 481 F. Supp. at 488.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the legislative
history of the 1976 amendment to § 6103.
140. 481 F. Supp. at 489.
141. Id
142. Id See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the structure of
§ 6103.
143. 481 F. Supp. at 489. See note 3 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the
FOIA's disclosure rule.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id at 490.
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B. The Deficiencies in the Zale Analysis
The decision ultimately reached in Zale, that section 6103 alone governs
the disclosure of tax return information, cannot be justified by the canons
upon which the court relies. The court based its decision upon its second
and third principles.' 47 These two critical canons indicate that a general
and earlier statute such as the FOIA should not nullify or modify a specific
and later statute such as section 6103 absent a clear contrary signal from
Congress. 148 These principles, however, do not automatically equate the
inability of the earlier and general FOIA to override section 6103 with
section 6103 nullification of FOIA.' 49 Only if conflict is established will
nullification of the FOIA be mandated by the two principles. 5 ° In Zale,
the court found that the purposes and structures of the FOIA and section
6103 were different. 5 ' It did not, however, specifically identify any con-
flicting provisions in the two acts.' 52 At most, the court established that
the specific and later section 6103 was juxtaposed against the general and
earlier FOIA in a situation where there was insufficient evidence that Con-
gress intended the FOIA to control. 5 3 Although this showing, when ap-
plied to the court's second and third principles, will justify a ruling that the
FOIA does not preempt section 6103, it will not justify a ruling that section
6103 overrides the FOIA.'5 4 Unless conflict is demonstrated, FOIA and
147. See notes 137-46 and accompanying text supra.
The court's first and fourth principles are principles of reconciliation. These rules are not
authority for the negation of statutes. See notes 134 & 136 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
149. Id
150. Id
151. 481 F. Supp. at 489. See notes 139-44 and accompanying text supra.
152. The Zale court contrasted the structures and purposes of the FOIA and § 6103. See
notes 137-44 and accompanying text supra. The court, however, did not say which provi-
sions of the two statutes were in conflict. If, by contrasting the purposes of the two Acts, the
court intended to show that the general rule of disclosure in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(1976), is in conflict with the provisions of § 6103 restricting public disclosure, I.R.C.
§ 6103(a), (c) & (e), the court failed in its endeavor. The court did not explain why exemp-
tion three, the FOIA's exemption for nondisclosure statutes, did not reconcile any such con-
flict.
It should also be noted that the two standards of review mentioned in Zale are not a
source of conflict between § 6103 and the FOIA. Although the FOIA contains a provision
calling for de novo review of certain agency actions, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976), § 6103
contains no provision for judicial review of agency action pursuant to it. Rather, the arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review utilized in Zale is authorized by chapter seven of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). If there is any conflict, it is between the FOIA and the
APA.
153. See notes 137-44 and accompanying text supra.
154. See note 135 supra.
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section 6103 coexistence is not foreclosed.' 55 Given this possibility, the
court's first and fourth principles, which express a strong preference for
statutory reconciliation, 5 6 dictate a holding of coexistence. Consequently,
the court's holding that section 6103 is the sole standard governing the
release of tax return information is, upon close examination, unsupported
by the very canons used to arrive at the result.
Another deficiency in the Zale court's analysis is its failure to consider
certain evidence suggesting FOIA control of section 6103. One example of
such evidence is the portion of the conference report for the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 which explains section 6110, the companion provision of sec-
tion 6103. The report states that memos of particular investigations and
certain other correspondence passing between the Justice Department and
the Internal Revenue Service will not be information controlled by the
access provisions of section 6110.157 To provide guidance on how this in-
formation should be released, the report added: "the question of the avail-
ability of these documents is to be governed by other provisions of law
including the Freedom of Information Act."'58 Since much of the infor-
mation under consideration meets the definition of return information' 59
covered by section 6103, and since the discussion of section 6110 appears
in the conference report just prior to the discussion of section 6103,160 the
statement arguably expresses congressional intent that return information,
and hence, section 6103, should come within the ambit of the FOIA.
A second indication that the FOIA rules apply to section 6103 material
is a remark by Senator Haskell during the Senate debates on section 6103.
Senator Haskell introduced an amendment designed to insure that statisti-
cal studies and other compilations of data by the IRS which were subject
to disclosure under original section 6103 would be available to the public
under the amended version of this section.' 6' In his proposal, the Senator
stated, "the definition of 'return information' was intended to neither en-
hance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act to statistical studies and compilations of data by the Internal
Revenue Service.'' 62 The Haskell amendment was adopted without fur-
155. Id.
156. See notes 134 & 136 and accompanying text supra.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 474-75, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4179-80 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1515].
158. Id at 4180.
159. For the definition of "return information," see note 82 supra.
160. See HOUSE REPORT 1515, supra note 157, at 4179-80.
161. 152 CONG. REC. 24012 (1976).
162. Id
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ther discussion by the Senator's colleagues.' 63 Moreover, the amendment
is not mentioned in any of the committee or conference reports. 64 Thus,
the Senator's remark is uncontradicted and provides an indication that
Congress did not intend section 6103 to override the FOIA.1
65
Perhaps the clearest sign that Congress designed the FOIA to govern
material written in section 6103 is exemption three itself. The Zale court
noted that section 6103 meets the requirements of exemption three. 166 The
court, however, did not consider whether Congress, by including in the
FOIA an exemption for data covered by certain types of nondisclosure
statutes, expressed an intention that the FOIA should control all nondis-
closure statutes meeting the requirements of the exemption. The Zale
court's failure to explain this evidence of congressional intent undermines
its ruling that there is no indication that Congress intended for the FOIA
to take precedence over the specific and subsequently enacted section
6103. 167
A final shortcoming in the Zale analysis is the omission of a relevant
canon from the court's catalogue of statutory principles. The omitted prin-
ciple states that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
68
Since section 6110 and the amendment of section 6103 were enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976169 and since section 6110 contains an
exclusive remedy provision,'7 the principle is relevant to the status of sec-
tion 6103 as a sole standard. According to the maxim, the express inclu-
sion of an exclusive remedy provision in section 6110, coupled with the
omission of such a provision in section 6103, indicates that section 6103
was not designed to be an exclusive disclosure provision. However, since
163. Id
164. The Haskell amendment, although adopted in the revision of § 6103, is not dis-
cussed in any of the several legislative reports accompanying the revision. The amendment
was not proposed until July 27, 1976 and therefore does not appear in any of the House and
Senate reports issued prior to that date. See SENATE REPORT 938 (PART I), Supra note 84;
HousE REPORT 658 (PART I), supra note 84. In addition, the amendment was not men-
tioned in either the House Ways and Means Committee Report of August 2, 1976, H.R. REP.
No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, or
the chamber's conference report, H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118; S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
165. Since the revision of § 6103 is largely the work of the Senate, the value of Senator
Haskell's remark as an indicator of congressional intent is not significantly diminished by
the failure of the House to consider his remarks. See note 87 supra.
166. 481 F. Supp. at 490 n.13.
167. Id. at 489.
168. This principle is also referred to as the expressio unius est exclusio aiterius principle.
See SANDS, supra note 128, at § 47.23.
169. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
170. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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principles of statutory construction in the final analysis are only guides to
congressional intent,"' the omission of this maxim is not necessarily fatal
to the Zale holding. Nevertheless, the court's failure to consider the
maxim weakens the court's purported reliance upon canons of statutory
construction.
C. A Remedial Hypothesisfor Certain Zale Defciencies and Its Efficacy
The deficiencies in the court's application of its second and third canons
could arguably be cured by a holding that the provisions of section 6103
do not come within exemption three. Under this hypothesis, the general
rule of the FOIA mandating disclosure unless a specific exemption applies
would conflict with the provisions of section 6103 that either dictate non-
disclosure or authorize discretionary disclosure by the Secretary of the
Treasury.' 72 Since coexistence would no longer be a possibility, section
6103 as a specific and later statute would override the earlier and general
FOIA unless Congress clearly indicated that the FOIA should be the over-
riding statute. 73
However, this remedial hypothesis requires a rejection of the Fruehauf
and Chamberlain decisions whereby the Fifth and Sixth Circuits placed
three provisions of section 6103 within exemption three. ' 74 The Fruehauf
decision is a straight-forward application of the statutory language of sub-
section 6103(a) and exemption three. The court simply pointed out that
exemption three automatically includes mandatory nondisclosure statutes
and that subsection 6103(a) mandates nondisclosure.' Rejection of this
decision, therefore, would be spurious. Similarly, repudiation of the
Chamberlain decision, which placed subsections 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6)
within exemption three, would be untenable. The Chamberlain court
anchored its decision upon four bases: the language of both exemption
three and the subsections; the legislative history of exemption three; the
principle that statutes should be reconciled wherever possible; and a pro-
cess whereby the court distinguished the two subsections of section 6103
from a statute outside the scope of exemption three and likened them to
statutes arguably coming within exemption three.' 76 Cogent arguments
171. See SANDS, supra note 128, at § 45.05.
172. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text supra.
173. Although this hypothesis eliminates the possibility of FOIA and § 6103 coexistence,
it would not require a ruling that the FOIA is negated by § 6103 to the extent they are in
conflict. There is still evidence which arguably establishes a congressional intent of FOIA
control. See notes 157-67 and accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 100-31 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 114-31 and accompanying text supra.
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can be made that the language and legislative history of the amendment to
exemption three are susceptible to more than one interpretation and that
the Chamberlain holdings relying on these factors are not mandated.,
77
Even if these arguments are accepted, however, they would not be fatal to
the Chamberlain decision. The court's principle of reconciliation dictates
that when two interpretations are possible, the interpretation which con-
strues the statutes harmoniously should be favored.' 78 Since inclusion of
subsections 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6) within exemption three harmonizes the
statutes while exclusion produces conflict, the principle of reconciliation
mandates inclusion. 79 In sum, because the Chamberlain and Fruehauf de-
cisions are correctly decided, the Zale decision cannot be cured by holding
that section 6103 does not come within exemption three.
D. The Questions Looming in Zale." The Court's Ulterior Motives and
the Decision's Practical Effect
The substantial flaws in the Zale statutory analysis suggest that the
court's decision may have been result-oriented. In all likelihood, the court
was concerned about Zale Corporation's use of the FOIA as a device to
circumvent the discovery rules, the huge administrative burden imposed
on the IRS by Zale's FOIA requests, and the detriment to the IRS's inves-
tigative capabilities caused by the processing of the massive requests.'
80
Removing tax return information from the FOIA also removed the strin-
177. See notes 116, 120 & 123 and accompanying text supra.
178. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
179. The Chamberlain decision also finds support in the decisions of other courts which
have placed nondisclosure statutes other than § 6103 within exemption three. See Con-
sumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980); see also note 127
supra," but see American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Export
Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401-2413 (1976), held nonqualifying under
exemption three); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978)
(court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1976), did
not qualify under exemption three).
180. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
A good explanation of the problems that agencies encounter in handling FOIA requests in
cases such as Zale appears in a letter from Richard J. Davies, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, to Victor L. Lowe, Director of the General Government Division of the General
Accounting Office. Excerpts from this letter follow:
There are other significant but intangible costs of processing Freedom of Informa-
tion requests. For instance, when a request is made for an open investigative file,
the steps necessary to process that request will tend to disrupt the investigation.
Records in open cases are generally exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act. However, the tasks of locating, indexing, and defending the
records from disclosure under the Act can complicate law enforcement activity.
Enforcement personnel must be diverted from their investigative activities to spend
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gent processing requirements imposed by the FOIA's de novo review. 8"
Substitution of the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard for the FOIA's
de novo review, therefore, might have been viewed as a means of lighten-
ing the administrative burden on the IRS and reducing the drain of inves-
tigative manpower resulting from the processing of the FOIA's requests.
In short, the court's statutory analysis may have been colored by a desire
to correct certain abuses of the FOIA.' s2
Whatever the merits of or motives behind the Zale decision, its immedi-
ate result is the substitution of the APA standard of review for the FOIA's
de novo review in judicial overseeing of IRS refusals to disclose tax return
information. According to Zale, the APA standard is highly deferential to
agency determinations. 83  Under this standard, the reviewing court
merely has to assure itself that the challenged IRS determination to with-
hold is "not an arbitrary or unconscionable abuse of discretion" and that
the determination is rational and has support in the record.' 84 The Zale
court, however, did not indicate the extent to which the showing required
of the IRS under the APA standard differed from that required under the
time analyzing the releasability of material in the investigative file, and the file
itself becomes temporarily unavailable for the purpose for which it is maintained.
One of the effects of this Amendment [1974 Amendment of the FOIA] has been
to offer to subjects of criminal investigations a viable alternative to the discovery
procedures available in each of the various judicial forums. The structure of the
Freedom of Information Act, . . . encourages court tests of agency decisions to
withhold information regardless of the obvious applicability of the claimed exemp-
tion. . . . [T]he judicially recognized methods of sustaining this burden [on the
agency] in many instances afford the plaintiff at least indirect relief. In this regard,
it has become commonplace for courts to require agencies to submit detailed affi-
davits regarding the claimed exemptions and/or indices of the documents or por-
tions thereof with respect to which exemption claims have been asserted ...
Should large numbers of individuals who are subject to pending criminal proceed-
ings institute actions of this type, the Department would find it extremely difficult
to meet the increased workload requirements.
Letter from Richard J. Davies to Victor L. Lowe (Oct. 31, 1978), reprinted in COMPTROLLER
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 14, at 30-32.
181. For a discussion of the processing requirements under the FOIA, see notes 37-40
and accompanying text supra.
182. If the Zale court's construction of the statutes at issue was influenced by a desire to
correct what the court considered to be an ill-advised statute, the decision is open to charges
of judicial legislation. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961). The charge of
judicial legislation in the context of the FOIA is not new. See Ginsburg, Feldman, & Bress
v. Federal Energy Administration, 591 F.2d 717, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissent-
ing).
183. 481 F. Supp. at 490.
184. Id
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FOIA.185 For instance, the court did not state that the IRS would never
have to furnish a Vaughn index 8 6 under the APA standard or that the
Service could simply rely on conclusory affidavits.187 Rather, the court
only decided that the detailed affidavits supplied by the IRS and the par-
tial in camera inspection performed by the court satisfied the APA stan-
dard.188 Consequently, the Zale decision provides courts scrutinizing IRS
retentions of tax return information with an alternative to the FOIA's de
novo review and suggests that the alternative standard would be less bur-
densome than the FOIA's review criteria. The decision does not, however,
delineate the practical scope of the new standard.
V. BEYOND Zale: UNCERTAINTY OVER THE STANDARD FOR
REVIEWING AGENCY RETENTIONS OF TAX RETURN
INFORMATION
A. An Overview of the Judicial Response to Zale
Since the Zale decision in late 1979, numerous federal courts have re-
viewed agency refusals to disclose tax return information. A significant
number of district courts have followed the Zale view that section 6103 is
the sole standard governing the release of tax return information. 89 Two
185. The subject matter of the standard of review set forth in Zale is the difficult area of
informal agency action. A concise statement of the standard of review for this type of action
by one notable commentator is as follows:
Whenever the scope of review is somewhere between the two extremes of de novo
review and complete unreviewability, as it usually is, the key to the scope of review
is not in the choice of formulas or standards such as "unsubstantial evidence" or
"arbitrary or capricious." The key lies in the prevailing judicial choice of what
content to put into the concept of reasonableness.
4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 283-84 (1st ed. Supp. 1980)
186. For a discussion of the Vaughn index, see notes 37, 40 & 48 and accompanying text
supra.
187. For a discussion of conclusory affidavits, see note 39 and accompanying text supra.
188. 481 F.Supp. at 490-91. The court suggested that the review performed in its deci-
sion would have satisfied the FOIA's de novo standard. Id at 490 n.13.
189. Chermack v. IRS, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. TAXES (P-H)(47 A.F.T.R.2d) 81-
1425, [1981 Transfer Binder] STAND FED. TAX REP. (CCH)(81-1 U.S.T.C.) 9337 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 13, 1981); Ashton v. Kurtz, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9465 (D.D.C. 1981); Ginter v. IRS, 46
A.F.T.R.2d 80-6080; 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9829 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Hulsey v. IRS, 497 F. Supp. 617
(N.D. Tex. 1980); Hanson v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5999 (N.D. Tex. 1980); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank of Savannah, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9774 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. IRS, 493 F. Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980); Abbott Laboratories v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-
5130, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9537 (D.D.C. 1980); Sizemore v. IRS, No. 3-79-0220-R (N.D. Tex.
May 19, 1980); Cal-Am Corp. v. IRS, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1576, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9421 (C.D.
Cal.1980); Wolfe v. IRS, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1565, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9354 (D. Col. 1980);
Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. IUl. 1980); cf. Brink v. IRS, No. 80-449C(l) (E.D.
Mo. July 17, 1980) (§ 6103 ruled "an independent federal access statute" without citing
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other district court decisions, however, have rejected this view. 9' A third
group of courts has ignored the Zale decision and applied the FOIA's de
novo review in accordance with Chamberlain and Fruehauf.19 1 Still, other
federal courts have recognized the two possible standards for reviewing tax
return information retentions but have not ruled on which standard is
preferable.' 92 The only circuit courts to mention Zale have not been
presented with the issue of the appropriate standard for reviewing tax re-
turn information retentions and have not chosen to express an opinion on
this issue. 193 Consequently, considerable confusion exists in the federal
courts over the appropriate standard for reviewing agency refusals to dis-
close tax return information.
Zale); Moody v. IRS, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1035, 80-1 U.S.T.C. $ 9254 (D.D.C. 1980) (Zale
does not preclude IRS from asserting FOIA exemptions other than exemption three to jus-
tify nondisclosure of tax return information).
190. Tigar & Buffone v. CIA, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. TAXES (P-H)(47 A.F.T.R.2d)
81-1310, [1981 Transfer Binder] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)(81-1 U.S.T.C.) $ 9245
(D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1981); Wohlgemuth v. IRS, No. C79-1558, slip op. (N.D. Ohio April 23,
1980) (rejecting Zale decision because FOIA de novo review is the "rule in the Sixth Cir-
cuit.").
191. Neufeld v. IRS, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. TAXES (P-H)(47 A.F.T.R.2d) 81-970
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 1981); Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980); Holmes v. IRS,
46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5562 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Huff v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5842 (D. Alaska
1980); cf Cliff v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying FOIA standard but citing
Zale to show that segregable portions of return information did not have to be released).
192. Perkins v. IRS, No. 80-8-MAC, slip op. at 1-2 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 1980) (§ 6103 is
the sole standard if there is any conflict between it and the FOIA); Good Hope Indus. v.
IRS, No. 80-0123-F (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 1980) (IRS failed both FOIA and APA standard);
Bernal v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5040, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9572 (D.C. Cal. 1980) (either rule of
Zale or rule of Chamberlain exempts the return information at issue). Cf. Kerner v. IRS,
No. 79-0114, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 1980) (court ruled on basis of IRS argument that
§ 6103 and exemption three exempted information at issue but noted the Zale standard
without expressing an opinion).
193. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States Postal Serv., 633 F.2d 1327, 1333
(9th Cir. 1980) (distinguished the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6) (1976),
from § 6103 when the government argued the Zale principles to justify nondisclosure under
39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6)); United States v. First Nat'l State Bank of New Jersey, 616 F.2d 668,
672 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1980) (explains that Zale prevents litigants from circumventing the discov-
ery rules through the FOIA).
Since Zale, two circuit courts of appeal, Neufeld v. IRS, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
TAXES (P-H) (47 A.F.T.R.2d) 81-970 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 1981) and Stephenson v. IRS, 629
F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980), have applied the FOIA standard in reviewing retentions of tax
return information by the IRS. In both cases, however, the IRS contended that the records
at issue were exempted from the FOIA's disclosure rule through exemption three and § 6103
and did not argue the Zale rule that § 6103 is the sole standard governing the release of tax
return information. Since Zale was not put at issue, the two circuit court rulings, although
not in accord with Zale, are not necessarily a rejection of Zale.
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B. Developments in the Arguments For and Against Zale
Despite the substantial judicial activity regarding agency retentions of
tax return information since Zale, only two courts have elaborated on the
Zale statutory analysis to any significant degree. In Cal-Am Corporation v.
Internal Revenue Service,'94 the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California attempted to bolster the Zale interpretation of
section 6103. The IRS had performed an administrative audit of Cal-Am
Corporation, a promoter of tax shelters. Cal-Am submitted an FOIA re-
quest seeking the administrative audit file. The IRS denied the request in
part and Cal-Am instituted a court action for disclosure. The district court
ruled that the IRS's retention was proper.' 95 Among the bases for the
court's decision, was a determination that the records at issue were return
information whose retention was authorized by subsection 6103(e)(6).' 96
The Cal-Am court indicated full agreement with Zale's ruling that sec-
tion 6103 is the sole standard governing the release of tax return informa-
tion.' 97 The court explained, however, that section 6103 "supercedes the
FOIA to the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes."'198
The court determined that in the comprehensive scheme of section 6103,
six separate subsections require the Secretary of the Treasury to withhold
documents solely on his determination that their release would in some
manner seriously impair federal tax administration.' 99 After citing two
provisions of section 6103 as examples,2°° the court ruled that "it would be
incongruous for the target of a criminal tax investigation to be able to
avoid the strictures of section 6103 by resort to an FOIA suit, to the extent
that the FOIA would require more liberal disclosure." '' The Cal-Am
court then buttressed its conclusion that section 6103 controls the FOIA to
the extent of any conflict by noting that Congress has continuously recog-
nized that federal tax administration is a vital government interest which
should receive minimal preenforcement scrutiny. 20 2
194. 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1576, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9421 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
195. Id at 80-1578, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146.
196. Id See note 18 supra for the text of § 6103(e)(6).
197. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1578, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146.
198. Id
199. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1578, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146. The court specifically cited
I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B), (h)(4) & (e)(7) (formerly I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6)).
200. The two provisions were I.R.C. §§ 6103(i)(1)(B) & 6103(a)(4).
201. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1578, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146.
202. Id The court cited three cases to support its claim that federal tax administration is
entitled to a minimum of preenforcement scrutiny. The cases are Bob Jones University v.
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1
(1962); and Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). Since none of these cases involve
disclosure issues, the Cal-Am court's assertion can be challenged for taking these decisions
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In contrast to the Zale court, the Cal-Am court did not avoid the ques-
tion whether conflict is necessary before section 6103 overrides the
FOIA.2 °3 This court specifically held that section 6103 supercedes the
FOIA only to the extent of the conflict between the two statutes. 204 The
court, however, failed in its attempt to identify the conflict. Although pro-
visions of section 6103 were cited, apparently to illustrate the conflict, 205
the court did not explain why the cited provisions could not be reconciled
to the FOIA through exemption three. The only explanation of the con-
flict provided by the court was that the FOIA may require "more liberal
disclosure" than the provisions of section 6103.206 This explanation, how-
ever, overlooks the fact that the FOIA requires no additional disclosure if
a nondisclosure statute comes within exemption three. 217 The Cal-Am
court determined that subsection 6103(e)(6), the only provision of section
6103 at issue, came within exemption three.20 8 Moreover, the court gave
no indication that any other provision of section 6103 restricting disclosure
to the public would not meet the requirements of the exemption. Conse-
quently, the Cal-Am decision does not establish the conflict needed for any
section 6103 nullification of the FOIA.2 °9
The only decision critical of the Zale court's statutory analysis was is-
sued by Judge Parker of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.210 In Tigar & Buffone v. Central Intelligence Agency,211 an
FOIA request for records regarding an investigation of Castle Bank, an
alleged conduit for CIA funds, was denied by the Tax Division of the Jus-
tice Department. Because of this denial and a related one by the Central
out of their context. Moreover, even if the court's ruling is valid, it would not apply to
§ 6103 in all situations since § 6103 is not limited to preenforcement situations.
203. For a discussion of the Zale court's failure to address the conffict issue, see notes
149-56 and accompanying text supra.
204. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1578, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146.
205. See notes 199-201 and accompanying text supra.
206. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1598, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,146. See also notes 199-201 and ac-
companying text supra.
207. If a nondisclosure statute comes within exemption three, the FOIA's general disclo-
sure rule does not apply. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Thus, no additional disclosure is required by
the FOIA. Only if the nondisclosure statute does not come within exemption three does the
FOIA require more disclosure. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
208. 45 A.F.T.R.2d at 80-1579 to 80-1581, 80-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,149. Although the Cal-
Am court upheld the IRS retention through the Zale approach, the court protected itself
against reversal by ruling in the alternative that § 6103(e)(6) met the requirements of exemp-
tion three and that the retention at issue could be justified under the FOIA rules. Id
209. See note 135 supra.
210. Judge Gesell who wrote the Zale opinion is also a judge of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia.
211. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. TAxEs (P-H) (47 A.F.T.R.2d) 81-1310 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,
1981).
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Intelligence Agency, the requester instituted an action for de novo review
under the FOIA. At trial, the Justice Department, relying on the Zale
approach, contended that certain retained records were return information
covered by section 6103 and, thus, outside the FOIA. The requester coun-
tered that the information at issue was not return information and that de
novo review was mandated in any event. The court ruled that de novo
review under the FOIA was required and ordered the Justice Department
to produce a Vaughn index so that the review could be performed.2 12
In its ruling, the court rejected the Zale holding that section 6103 is the
sole standard governing the release of tax return information.213 The court
reasoned that Congress intended the FOIA to apply to all agency records
and that it was unlikely that the enactment of section 6103 subsequent to
the latest FOIA amendments negated that intention.2 4 The court also
ruled that exemption three is an indicator of congressional design to bring
nondisclosure statutes enacted after the FOIA within the purview of the
FOIA.215 Moreover, the court implied that the Zale decision did not con-
tradict this design in the case of section 6103 because the nondisclosure at
issue in Zale was ruled proper under exemption three.2 , 6 Therefore, the
Tiar & Buffone court refused to discard the FOIA's safeguard of de novo
review in scrutinizing agency nondisclosure of tax return information.
Judge Parker's decision in Tgar & Buffone did not contain an exhaus-
tive listing of the deficiencies in the Zale analysis.2 7 The court, nonethe-
less, recognized the Zale misapplication of the principle governing the
repeal of earlier enacted statutes by later ones.218 More important, the
court pointed out that exemption three embodies a congressional intent to
bring subsequently enacted nondisclosure statutes within the ambit of the
FOIA.21 9 The Tigar & Buffone court thereby contradicted the Zale ruling
that there is no evidence of congressional intent that the FOIA take prece-
dence over section 6103.220 Thus, T'gar & Buffone is at least a starting
point for judicial recognition of the flaws in the Zale decision.
212. Id at 81-1311.
213. Id
214. Id
215. Id
216. Id
217. See notes 147-71 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the deficiencies in
Zale.
218. See notes 147-56 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 166 & 167 and accompanying text supra.
220. 481 F. Supp. at 489.
[Vol. 30:675
Disclosure of Tax Return Information
C Application of the New APA Standard- Judicial Review in Disarray
The district courts which have applied the APA standard of review es-
poused by Zale have not arrived at a consensus regarding the practical
scope of this standard. Some of these courts have performed their own in
camera inspections of the disputed documents.22' Others have simply
ruled that a Vaughn index is not required by the APA standard.2 2 In
other cases, the standard has been satisfied by government affidavits which
state that the records in dispute are return information whose release
would seriously impair tax administration.223 One court, however, has
ruled that the APA standard cannot be satisfied by such affidavits.2 24
Thus, the post-Zale decisions have not substantially clarified how the APA
standard differs in application from the FOIA's de novo review.
D. Litigation on the Horizon?
An additional consequence implicit in the Zale decision, the removal of
the FOIA safeguards other than the right of de novo review 225 from tax
return information disclosure requests, has not, to date, produced any liti-
gation. For example, the FOIA contains a requirement that agencies re-
spond to requests within ten working days of the initial filing.226 Because
the FOIA does not apply to tax return information under the Zale inter-
pretation, the IRS would not have to meet this deadline when return infor-
mation is requested. If the Zale decision gains support at the circuit court
level, litigation over the FOIA safeguards other than de novo review can
-be expected.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FOIA strives to ensure full agency disclosure whenever important
interests specifically designated by Congress do not dictate otherwise. In
Zale, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia re-
221. Eg.., Kanter v. IRS, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Abbott Laboratories v. IRS,
46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5130, 80-2 U.S.T.C. $ 9537 (D.D.C. 1980); Wolfe v. IRS, 45 A.F.T.R.2d
80-1565, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9353 (D. Col. 1980); Ginter v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-6080, 80-2
U.S.T.C. 8929 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
222. E.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Savannah, 80-2 U.S.T.C. 9774 (W.D.
Tenn. 1980); Ashton v. Kurtz, No. 78-822, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1981).
223. Anheuser-Busch v. IRS, 493 F. Supp. 549 (D.D.C. 1980); Cal-am Corp. v. IRS, 45
A.F.T.R.2d 80-1576, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9421 (C.D. Ca1.1980); Hulsey v. IRS, 497 F. Supp. 617
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (affidavit with specificity); Hanson v. IRS, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 80-5999 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
224. Good Hope Indus. v. United States, No. 80-0123-F (D. Mass. Aug 21, 1980).
225. For examples of the safeguards, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
226. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(i) (1976).
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moved a particular category of records, tax return information, from the
ambit of the FOIA. Through a rationale based upon principles of statu-
tory construction, the Zale court determined that section 6103 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code alone governs the disclosure of this information.
Unlike the earlier Fruehauf and Chamberlain decisions, the Zale decision
did not consider section 6103's falling within the FOIA's exemption for
nondisclosure statutes to be of any consequence in determining whether
tax return information is subject to the FOIA rules. Questionable rulings
in the Zale court's statutory analysis suggest that the decision was result-
oriented. Apparently, the court sought to cure certain abuses of the FOIA
by substituting the APA's highly deferential standard of review for the rig-
orous de novo review required by the FOIA. To date, this substitution has
produced confusion in the federal courts not only regarding which of the
two standards applies in judicial review of agency retention of tax return
information but also regarding the practical scope of the APA standard of
review when this standard has been employed. Because of the deficiencies
in the Zale rationale, the judiciary should ultimately end this confusion by
repudiating the Zale approach and completely restoring the FOIA and its
safeguards to the area of tax return information.
Robert W Metzler
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